In this course we study three different topics related to collective decision making. Previous knowledge on Microeconomic Theory and Game Theory is needed to follow the lectures.
In the first part of the course we analyze different types of voting rules which are commonly used to take institutional decisions. Besides, we describe and analyze the consequences of applying different electoral systems in the government of a country.
In the second part of the course we study the theory of mechanism design. Once we have identified which are the desired outcomes of the society (social goals), we analyze whether or not an appropriate institution (mechanism) can be designed to attain that goal. We study under which conditions one can design such a mechanism depending on the behavioral assumptions for the agents (dominant strategies and Nash equilibrium).
In the third part of the course, we study “theoretically motivated mechanisms” that have successfully been employed to match university graduates to their first professional position, and to assign students to public schools. We will learn (some of) the theoretical concepts and ideas underlying these applications, analyze and compare some real-life matching mechanisms and learn that there is an interesting interplay between the design of real-life market mechanisms and the advancement of the theory.
  • Profesor: Amorós González Pablo
  • Profesor: Moreno Jiménez Bernardo
  • Profesor: Puy Segura María Socorro